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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 22, 2012, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights ruled, in the case of Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), that an
Italian law revoking the right to vote for life for those who are
convicted of a crime and sentenced to at least five years
imprisonment did not violate Article 3 of the First Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights (the “Convention”).1 Article
3 of the First Protocol to the Convention binds its Contracting Parties
to hold “free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the
people in the choice of the legislature.”2 Denying citizens the right to
vote as a result of a criminal conviction is an ancient practice known
as criminal disenfranchisement.3 It is a form of civic punishment
employed around the world in a variety of manners including
1. See Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx? i=001-111044 (ruling that
the Italian law on prisoner disenfranchisement did not violate Article 3 of the First
Protocol).
2. Protocol One to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S. 9 [hereinafter First
Protocol].
3. See Morgan Macdonald, Note, Disproportionate Punishment: The Legality
of Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1375, 1375 (2009) (tracing the
history of criminal disenfranchisement back to Greek and Roman societies).
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disenfranchisement for life, disenfranchisement only for certain
crimes, and disenfranchisement for the duration of a prison
sentence.4
Part II of this comment will look first at the European Court of
Human Rights generally and the doctrines it has developed for
interpreting the Convention over the years. Part II will then discuss
the history of the Court’s jurisprudence on Article 3 of the First
Protocol. Part II will conclude by examining Article 31(3)(C) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as an option for
alternative interpretations of the Convention, as well as looking at
more recent treaties and international documents regarding voting
rights and the treatment of prisoners. Part III of this comment will
begin by arguing that the proportionality analysis used in Scoppola
(No. 3) is inconsistent with the Court’s prior jurisprudence and that
the proportionality analysis creates outcomes that are inconsistent
with an evolutive interpretation of the Convention, falling outside a
reasonable margin of appreciation. Furthermore, Part III will also
argue that the Scoppola (No. 3) decision is not consistent with the
Convention when analyzed in light of more recent international
documents according to Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention.
Part IV of this comment will make recommendations for how the
Convention can be changed so that the voting rights of prisoners and
convicts will be protected in the manner guaranteed by the
Convention, including the addition of an explicit limitations clause
on Article 3 of the First Protocol.

II. BACKGROUND
The background section of this comment will focus primarily on
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the
“Court”). First, it will look at the background of the Court and the
doctrines it has developed in interpreting the Convention. The next
section will look at the prior decisions of the Court involving Article
3 of the First Protocol, focusing on recent decisions involving
criminal disenfranchisement. Finally, the last sections will look at an
alternative method of interpretation under Article 31(3)(c) of the
4. See generally id. (analyzing differences in criminal disenfranchisement
laws around the world, including Europe, in the context of Article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR]).
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that allows for the use of
external international documents on prisoner’s rights and voting
rights.

A. THE CONVENTION AND THE COURT
In the wake of World War II and the subsequent Soviet
domination of Eastern Europe, the Council of Europe conceived of
the European Convention on Human Rights (the “Convention”) both
as a statement of the common values of Western Europe and as a
bulwark against communist subversion.5 To that end, the Council
established strong enforcement mechanisms for the Convention.6
These protections include allowing individuals to petition the Court
for redress against a Contracting Party’s violation of their rights and
making the decisions of the Court binding on the Contracting
Parties.7
1. Evolutive Interpretation Allows the ECHR to Incorporate Modern
Norms of Human Rights into Articles of the Convention
The Court has long acknowledged the need to harmonize
Convention standards with social developments.8 This first became
apparent in Golder v. United Kingdom, a case that decided whether
the United Kingdom could restrain a prisoner from contacting legal
counsel to discuss a lawsuit against a prison guard whom he believed
5. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms pmbl., Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]
(affirming the shared political traditions and ideals of the signatories, including
freedom and the rule of law); see also DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 2008).
6. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2–4 (describing the Convention’s
evolution as analogous to a European Bill of Rights, with the Court in the role of a
national constitutional court); see also Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, The Use of Article
31(3)(C) of the VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR: An Effective AntiFragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human
Rights Teleology?, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 621, 626–27 (2010) (referring to the
Convention as a “regional quasi-constitution” that reflects the increased integration
of Europe).
7. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 4–5 (emphasizing that the protections
offered by the Convention employ “strong enforcement mechanisms”).
8. See YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR
197 (2002) (tracing the origins of evolutive interpretation back to the mid-1970s).
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libeled him, resulting in the denial of his parole.9 In deciding the case
in Golder’s favor, the Court incorporated a right of access to a court
into the Convention’s Article 6 right to a fair trial.10 The Court
accomplished this by ascribing great importance to portions of the
Convention that emphasize respect for the rule of law.11 The Court
considered access to the courts as a key component of the rule of
law.12 This landmark decision affirmed the nature of the Convention
as a guarantee of human rights in Europe, not merely as a contract by
which sovereign states agree to limit their sovereignty.13 The ruling
also established the principle that the lack of an explicit provision in
the text of an article of the Convention is not a complete barrier to
granting an unenumerated right.14
The Court elaborated on the process of expanding Convention
protections in Tyrer v. United Kingdom, which concerned whether
the judicial corporal punishment of a minor as a punishment for a
criminal assault violated Article 3 of the Convention.15 In ruling for
9. See Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser.
A) at 9 (1975) (deciding in favor of the right of a prisoner to access counsel and a
court to lodge a libel claim against one of his jailers).
10. See Golder, App. No. 4451/70, at 18 (concluding that article 6 provides the
“right to a court,” which includes the right of access to the court); HARRIS ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 6 (“[O]ne could not suppose compliance with the rule of law
without the possibility of taking disputes to court.”); see also George Letsas,
Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer, 21 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 509, 516 (2010) (referring to the decision in Golder as bold and
revolutionary for incorporating a right not explicitly included in the Convention
text).
11. See Golder, App. No. 4451/70, at 17 (citing explicitly to Article 3 and the
Preamble of the Convention as examples of sections stressing the importance of
the rule of law).
12. See id. (stating that the rule of law only functions properly where
individuals have access to courts).
13. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 6; see also Golder, App. No. 4451/70,
at 564 (elaborating that to interpret the Convention any other way would create the
possibility for Contracting Parties to arbitrarily restrict access to the court system
without violating the Convention).
14. See Golder, App. No. 4451/70, at 18 (finding that article 6 provides a right
of access to courts even though no specific provision grants it); see, e.g., Matthews
v. United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 252, 267 (“The mere fact that a body was
not envisaged by the drafters of the Convention cannot prevent that body from
falling within the scope of the Convention.”).
15. See generally Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)
(deciding that judicial corporal punishment of a minor violated the Convention’s
Article 3 prohibition on degrading punishment).
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the minor, the Court declared that “the Convention is a living
instrument which . . . must be interpreted in the light of present-day
conditions.”16 This is commonly known as the evolutive
interpretation17 and allows the Court to interpret the Convention to
adapt to changing social attitudes.18 In Tyrer, the Court justified its
ruling by explaining that a great majority of Contracting Parties did
not allow judicial corporal punishment.19 However, a great majority
of the Contracting Parties need not change their law before the Court
will incorporate a new standard into the Convention.20 In the absence
of a European consensus, the Court previously incorporated a right
on the basis of a prevailing international trend.21 In these ways, the
Court has used evolutive interpretation to expand the protections of
the Convention in response to a variety of social developments.22
2. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine Allows the Court to Take
Account of Unique National Conditions When Deciding a Case
The margin of appreciation doctrine refers to the degree of
16. See id. at 15.
17. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (showing where the Court used
modern-day norms to effect incremental change); see also Letsas, supra note 10, at
527 (describing evolutive interpretation as the doctrine that most embodies the
Court’s interpretive ethic).
18. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (referring to the Court as interpreting
the general intentions of the parties, not the particular intentions of the parties in
1950).
19. See Alastair Mowbray, The Creativity of the European Court of Human
Rights, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV 57, 61 (2010) (quoting from the Tyrer judgment and
noting that the majority of Contracting Parties did not use juvenile corporal
punishment); see also Marckx Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1979) (citing
that a great majority of Contracting Parties had adopted a standard regarding
children born out of wedlock as a reason for incorporating that standard into the
Convention).
20. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 8 (describing the standard used by the
Court in Goodwin v. United Kingdom as less demanding than a great majority
standard).
21. See, e.g., Goodwin Christine v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
(incorporating a right to legal recognition of gender identity for post-operative
transsexuals based on a prevailing international trend, rather than a European
consensus).
22. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (emphasizing that evolutive
interpretation should not be used to introduce a right into the Convention that has
no basis in its text, drawing a fine line between judicial interpretation and judicial
legislation).
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independence afforded to a State when applying the provisions of the
Convention to its national laws.23 The Court first fully articulated this
doctrine in Handyside v. United Kingdom, which dealt with whether
the British government could restrain a publisher from publishing a
book the government deemed obscene.24 In the absence of a
standardized set of European morals, the Court determined that it is
for the national authorities to decide what is necessary for the
protection of morals in a democratic society.25
The breadth of the margin of appreciation is dependent on the
context in which it is applied.26 The margin is construed broadly
where a Convention article does not have an explicit limitations
clause, as is the case for criminal disenfranchisement.27 Articles 8
through 11, which contain highly specific limitations clauses, stand
in sharp contrast to those articles under which the Court grants States
a broader margin of appreciation.28 Due to the specificity of the text
of the articles, a narrower margin is applied by the Court.29 The
margin is not only construed in the context of the Convention article
in question. It is also responsive to national conditions, thus
23. See FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (2d ed. 1996) (defining margins of
appreciation as the outer limits of schemes of protection which are still acceptable
under the Convention).
24. See generally Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. (ser. A)
(1976) (holding that seizure of a textbook intended for teenagers was justified by
the protection of public morals).
25. See id. at 753–54 (stating that local authorities are in a better position than
international judges to determine what violates the morals of that locality).
26. See JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 23, at 37 (referring to the subject matter
and circumstances of a case as factors affecting the breadth of the margin); see also
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 13 (contrasting the wide margin applied in cases
involving national emergencies and public morals with the narrow margin applied
in cases involving integral parts of a person’s identity, such as sexual orientation).
27. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 14 (citing the Court’s jurisprudence
on Article 3 of the First Protocol as an example of where the lack of an express
limitations clause has broadened the margin of appreciation).
28. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 5, art. 8(2) (limiting violations of the right to
respect for private and family life to certain situations provided for by law which
are necessary in a democratic society as in the Goodwin case, which found that
denying legal recognition of the gender identity of post-operative transsexuals
could not be justified as necessary in a democratic society).
29. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 9 (stating that the limitations clauses
were placed in these articles, with an accordingly narrow margin of appreciation,
to protect the most vital Convention rights).
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reinforcing the Convention as the bare minimum human rights
standard in Europe.30 That is to say, what is a legitimate aim in
Latvia is not the same as in Turkey.31
3. Under Proportionality Doctrine, the Court Weighs the Extent of
the Violation of a Convention-Protected Right Against the State’s
Margin of Appreciation
The final interpretive doctrine at issue here is the doctrine of
proportionality. Proportionality is the mechanism by which the Court
determines whether a State exceeds its margin of appreciation.32
Specifically, this principle asks if the deviation from the Convention
“is not excessive in relation to the legitimate needs or interests that
have caused it.”33 The goal of the doctrine is to find a fair balance
“between the demands of the general interest of the community and
the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental
rights.”34 More narrowly, the Court requires that the means employed
by a State be proportionate to the aim pursued.35
In application, the doctrine has come under attack for not living up
to its mandate,36 leading to decisions that can appear to be unjust and
30. See id. at 3 (describing the guarantees of the Convention as the minimum
standard).
31. See, e.g., Ždanoka v. Latvia, App. No. 58278/00, 45 Eur. Ct. Rep. 17, 7980 (2006) (holding that Latvia was within the margin of appreciation in banning an
unrepentant member of the Communist party from public office for life because of
her actions during the 1991 revolution); Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 41
Eur. Ct. H.R. 8, 30 (2005) (holding that Turkey did not violate the Convention by
banning students from wearing the Islamic headscarf in public university lecture
halls because of the Turkish government’s interest in maintaining a secular
society).
32. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 193 (referring to proportionality as
a yardstick measuring whether a national authority overstepped its margin of
appreciation).
33. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 80 (3d ed. 1998) (characterizing the
principle as a balance between the needs of the community and the rights of the
individual).
34. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45 (1989)
(holding that the UK would violate the Convention if it extradited a West German
national to America where he could be sentenced to the death penalty).
35. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 14 (referring to proportionality as a
way to prevent the overburdening of individual rights in pursuit of societal goods).
36. See generally Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human
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to value the interests of the community over the individual’s
fundamental rights.37 Specifically, the Court in Otto-PremingerInstitut v. Austria, which looked at whether local Austrian authorities
could prevent the public exhibition of a film believed to be offensive
to the majority Catholic population, held that the protection of
religious peace and prevention of religious offense outweighed an
individual’s right to freedom of expression.38 In circumstances such
as these, where the Court decides whether a State exceeded its
margin of appreciation, the Court assesses whether the national
legislature considered issues of proportionality in drafting the law;
the Court will find a law disproportionate if the State did not make
any such considerations.39

B. PRINCIPLES OF ECHR JURISPRUDENCE ON ARTICLE 3 OF
PROTOCOL 1
1. The Case of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 1987
The jurisprudence of the ECHR with regard to Article 3 of the
First Protocol begins with the landmark case of Mathieu-Mohin and
Clerfayt v. Belgium.40 Two French-speaking Belgian legislators
brought the case, alleging illegal discrimination when they were
Rights? (NYU Law Sch. Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 09/08, 2008),
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/08/080901.pdf (identifying situations
where proportionality analysis failed to protect the rights of the individual by
overemphasizing the social worth of the violation to society).
37. See, e.g., IA v. Turkey, App. No. 42578/98, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 249, 258
(2005) (holding that seizure of a ‘blasphemous’ book did not violate the
Convention because the interests of the public in respect for their religion
outweighed the freedom of religious expression of the author); Otto-PremingerInstitut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21 (1994) (holding that
Austria did not violate Article 10 by seizing a film perceived to be offensive to
Tyrolean Catholics).
38. See Otto-Preminger-Institut, App. No. 13470/87, at 59–60 (justifying the
seizure of the film by saying that if it had been displayed, some people would feel
their religious beliefs were under attack).
39. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 11–12 (stating that a law should not be
found proportionate where there is no evidence that national authorities had
considered its proportionality).
40. See Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1987)
(stating that prior to 1987 the Court had not ruled on this issue); see also JACOBS &
WHITE, supra note 23, at 270 (quoting the Mathieu-Mohin case for a statement of
the scope of the right protected under Article 3 of Protocol 1).
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denied admission, by law, to the local Flemish council because they
took their legislative oaths in French.41 The pair alleged that by
preventing them from being elected to the council because they
chose to take their legislative oath in their native tongue, the law
violated their rights under the Convention.42 In deciding the case, the
Court set forth several principles that form the bedrock of
jurisprudence for this comment.43
The first of these principles is that these rights guaranteed under
Article 3 are individual rights, despite the article’s ambiguous
wording.44 The second principle is that the rights are not absolute
and, in the absence of an express limitations clause, are subject to
implied limitations with a wide margin of appreciation afforded to
State parties.45 The last principle is that, in limiting the right, a State
must not curtail it to the extent that it “impairs the essence of the
right and deprives it of its effectiveness.”46 The Court evaluates this
standard by determining if the narrowing of the right is in “pursuit of
a legitimate aim and that the means employed are not
disproportionate.”47

41. See Mathieu-Mohin, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19, 21 (explaining that
Belgian law requires members of the Flemish council to take their legislative oath
in Flemish).
42. See id. at 21 (implying that the language requirement thwarts the free
expression of the people in the choice of legislature).
43. See Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx? i=001-111044 (citing to
Mathieu-Mohin for a statement of the Court’s general principles on Article 3). See
generally HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 713–14 (summarizing the main principles
of the Mathieu-Mohin judgment and noting that the Court acknowledges the
sensitive issues a State faces in managing its electoral process).
44. See Mathieu-Mohin, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22-23 (clarifying that
Article 3 of the First Protocol is worded not to merely create obligations between
the States, but to create a positive obligation on the States to hold free elections for
the people).
45. See id. (affirming that the States are free to institute any particular electoral
system so long as it is democratic).
46. See id. at 23.
47. See id.
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2. Criminal Disenfranchisement Decisions of the ECHR
a. The Case of Labita v. Italy, 2000
The Court first decided a criminal disenfranchisement case using
the Mathieu-Mohin principles in 2000, in Labita v. Italy.48 Benedetto
Labita was arrested in 1992 on suspicion of being a mafioso.49 He
was disenfranchised as part of a set of temporary preventive
measures imposed upon him by virtue of his being an accused
mafioso.50 Labita was disenfranchised after his acquittal in 1995 until
the term of disenfranchisement expired in late 1997.51
In analyzing Labita’s disenfranchisement under the MathieuMohin principles, the Court found that the Government’s articulated
aim of discouraging mafia influence on the Italian political system
was legitimate.52 However, the Court found his disenfranchisement
disproportionate because it was imposed after his acquittal, which
removed the basis for imposing disenfranchisement in the first
place.53 This appears to impose a requirement that, to be
proportionate, the punishment must bear a relevant and sufficient
link to the legitimate aim.54 The Court implicitly afforded the Italian
government a wide margin of appreciation in this case because of the
historical threat the mafia has posed to Italian political structures.55
48. See Labita v. Italy, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 148.
49. See id. at 102 (explaining that Labita was suspected of running a financial
company for his brother-in-law, who authorities believed to be the head of the
local mafia, based on the cooperating testimony of a former mafioso).
50. See id. at 1246 (citing Article 32 of Presidential Decree 223 of March 20,
1967 as authority for the removal of civil rights).
51. See id. at 1244–45 (detailing the timeline of the preventive measures
imposed upon Labita).
52. See id. at 1266 (framing the aim of the government in terms of the mafia’s
risk to Italian politics because mafia members would vote for other mafia
members).
53. See id. (stating that the acquittal nullified any suspicion of mafia
involvement that would have justified the imposition of disenfranchisement).
54. See William Ashby Powers, Comment, Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2): A
First Look at Prisoner Disenfranchisement by the European Court of Human
Rights, 21 CONN. J. INT’L L. 243, 266–67 (2006) (“This ‘lack of concrete evidence’
severed the sufficient relationship that had existed between disenfranchisement and
the government’s aim of preventing the mafia from influencing elections.”).
55. See generally Benjamin Scotti, Comment, RICO Vs. 416-bis: A
Comparison of U.S. and Italian Anti-Organized Crime Legislation, 25 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP L. REV. 143 (detailing the mafia’s past and current influence on
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b. The Case of Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2004-2006
On March 30, 2004, a seven-judge Chamber of the Court handed
down a judgment in the case of Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2).56 Using
an axe, John Hirst killed his elderly landlady.57 For this crime, he was
convicted and sentenced to a discretionary sentence of life
imprisonment, with a fourteen-year tariff.58 Pursuant to the
Representation of the People Act 1983, Hirst lost the right to vote for the
term of his imprisonment due to his conviction and custodial sentence.59
The British government argued before the Chamber that the Act
pursued the legitimate aims of “preventing crime and punishing
offenders” as well as “enhancing civic responsibility and respect for
the rule of law.”60 In evaluating these aims, the Chamber relied
heavily on the analysis of the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of
Sauvé v. Canada (No. 2).61 The Canadian Court found that neither
aim bore a rational link to criminal disenfranchisement and that
disenfranchisement may instead undermine those aims.62 However,
the Chamber declined to rule on the aim, citing the margin of
appreciation, and chose instead to find the law disproportionate.63
This construction reflects the nature of the Chamber’s analysis, with
Italian politics).
56. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, 2005-IX Eur. Ct.
H.R. 189, 220 (2005) (holding that the 1983 Representation of the People Act
violated Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights).
57. See Powers, supra note 54, at 269.
58. See Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 214 (explaining that a tariff is
the part of the sentence relating to retribution and deterrence, allowing for further
imprisonment based on the parole authority’s belief that the offender is a danger).
59. See id. at 197 (citing Section 3 of the Representation of the People Act
1983, stating that a person who is convicted of a crime and receives a custodial
sentence shall be banned from voting in parliamentary or any other elections for
the term of his imprisonment).
60. See id. at 207.
61. See id. at 201 (acknowledging the differences in the Canadian Charter and
the European Convention while still finding the analysis of the Canadian court
relevant to the circumstances).
62. See id.; Sauvé v. Canada (No. 2), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.) (rejecting the
arguments of the Canadian government that there is a “rational link” between the
legitimate aims argued and the disenfranchisement penalty).
63. See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 214
(refraining from ruling on the aims of the governments because of the vast
disparity in penal practices among member states).
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legitimate aim and proportionality forming independent bases for
finding a law in violation of Article 3 of the First Protocol.64
In finding the law disproportionate, the Chamber focused on the
large number of people (more than 70,000) affected by the
disenfranchisement as well as its automatic, arbitrary and
indiscriminate nature.65 The Chamber also assessed whether the
Parliament considered issues of proportionality in passing the law
and found that it did not.66 The Chamber concluded by determining
that a narrower tailoring of the law could be proportionate but that
the law as it stood fell outside any “acceptable margin of
appreciation.”67
Upon appeal from the British Government, a full Grand Chamber
of the Court ruled on the case on October 6, 2005.68 This Court, too,
found the law in violation of the article but altered some of the
reasoning of the lower Chamber.69 The Court took particular care at
the beginning to emphasize the vital nature of the right to vote as a
right that upholds the legitimacy of government and not a privilege
that may be revoked.70 However, contrary to the reticence of the
Chamber, the Court emphatically endorsed the aims of the
government.71
64. Compare Powers, supra note 54, at 283–84 (describing the bifurcated
nature of the Court’s inquiry), with Powers, supra note 54, at 284 (elaborating on
the Canadian style of analysis which balances the aim, however illegitimate,
against the deprivation of the right and looks for a “rational link” between the
two).
65. See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 216 (describing the effect on the
people as arbitrary and indiscriminate because there is no consideration of the
particular crime or of individual circumstances).
66. See id. at 204 (stating that Parliament never weighed the competing
interests of the effects on the prisoner and the social value of disenfranchisement).
67. See id.
68. See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 220 (upholding the judgment of the
Chamber that the British law violated Article 3 of the First Protocol).
69. See Powers, supra note 54, at 289–93 (explaining that the Court discounted
the analysis initially used in the Chamber’s decision).
70. See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. , at 201 (elaborating on the evolution of
voting rights from a time when only elite groups could vote to today where
universal suffrage is the standard, further stating that any departure from the
principle undermines the rule of law).
71. See id. at 214 (disregarding both the analysis of the Canadian court from
Sauvé (No. 2) and doubts about the efficacy of the measures in achieving the
articulated aims, which the Court did not find incompatible per se with the
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In its analysis of the law’s proportionality, the Court endorsed the
reasoning of the Chamber.72 The Court further criticized the
indiscriminate nature of the disenfranchisement by noting that the
punishment was an ancillary penalty not announced during
sentencing.73
c. The Case of Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), 2012
On May 22, 2012, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
Italy did not violate Franco Scoppola’s rights under the Convention
when it disenfranchised him pursuant to his conviction and life
sentence for murdering his wife.74 The law that allowed for
Scoppola’s disenfranchisement, Presidential Decree no. 223/1967,
provides that all those sentenced to five years’ imprisonment or more
shall be banned from running for public office for life.75
The Court began its analysis by adopting the reasoning of the
Hirst (No. 2) Court with regard to legitimate aim.76 Turning next to
the proportionality inquiry, the Court utilized the analysis of the
Hirst (No. 2) Court, examining the automatic, arbitrary, and
indiscriminate nature of the law.77 As to the arbitrary nature of the
law, the Court differentiated the Italian law by emphasizing that the
length of disenfranchisement varies according to the length of
sentence and only applies to those with a sentence of three years or

Convention).
72. See id. at 217.
73. See id. at 215 (“[T]he criminal courts in England and Wales make no
reference to disenfranchisement and it is not apparent . . . that there is any direct
link between the facts of any individual case and the removal of the right.”).
74. See Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx? i=001-111044 (detailing the
particulars of Scoppola’s crime and the proceedings against him).
75. See id. at 5–6 (correlating voting bans to the duration an individual is
imprisoned, ranging from a five-year ban for those sentenced three to five years to
a possible lifting of the ban three years after release).
76. See id. at 13 (accepting that disenfranchisement serves the aims of
preventing crime and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of
law).
77. See id. at 14 (“[W]hen disenfranchisement affects a group of people
generally, automatically, and indiscriminately, based solely on the fact that they
are serving a prison sentence, irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offense
and their individual circumstances, it is not compatible with Article 3 of Protocol
Number 1.”).
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longer.78 The Court differentiated the indiscriminate nature of the
British law from the Italian law by pointing to the Italian sentencing
criteria, which allows for the court to take account individual
circumstances when determining the length of sentence.79
Furthermore, the Court also felt that mechanisms of the Italian
penitentiary system that allowed for reductions in sentence length
based on good behavior in connection with the possibility of
regaining the right to vote three years after release mitigated the
indiscriminate nature of the law.80

C. ARTICLE 31(3)(C) OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF ANALYSIS
THAT INCORPORATES EXTERNAL RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention states that, along with
all other internal context, external rules of international law
applicable in the relations of the parties may be considered when
interpreting the terms of a treaty.81 The policy underlying this
practice reflects a need to harmonize regimes of international law
through interpretation in light of evolving international norms.82 In
that respect, the policy is similar to the Court’s own internal doctrine
of evolutive interpretation.
Article 31(3)(c) analysis is a practice that is familiar to the Court,
having applied it in various contexts in recent years.83 In employing a
78. See id. at 16 (explaining that because the British law disenfranchises people
sentenced for more minor offenses than the Italian law, it is less proportionate).
79. See id. (citing the Italian sentencing guidelines as a factor supporting the
proportionate nature of the sentence because the length of sentence determines
disenfranchisement).
80. See id. (emphasizing the possibility of early release and rehabilitation as
major factors for finding the Italian system proportionate).
81. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (allowing for subsequent applications of the treaty to be used to
interpret both the treaty’s context and application).
82. See Julian Arato, Constitutional Transformation in the ECTHR:
Strasbourg’s Expansive Recourse to External Rules of International Law, 37
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 349, 355 (2012) (emphasizing that a 31(3)(c) analysis should
derive new meaning for a provision of a treaty from external sources).
83. See, e.g., Demir v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54
(2008) (interpreting municipal employees collective bargaining rights); Al-Adsani
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 11 (2002) (analyzing
sovereign immunity).
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31(3)(c) analysis, the Court examines a variety of documents,
including other treaties, non-binding documents published by bodies
of the Council of Europe, and non-binding documents of other
international organizations.84 This is shown in both the Scoppola (No.
3) and Hirst (No. 2) decisions, which reprint sections of relevant
international documents, though neither case directly cites Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention.85

D. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON VOTING RIGHTS
AND THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
Having established that international documents can play a
significant role in interpreting the Convention, it is important now to
examine relevant documents on the rights of prisoners and the right
to vote. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
the predominant international treaty in these areas, though several
other European and international documents provide additional
clarity.86
1. International Documents on the Rights of Prisoners Emphasize the
Reintroduction of the Prisoner to Society as the Primary Goal of
Incarceration
Article 10 of the ICCPR relates to the general treatment of
prisoners, mandating that they be treated with the respect and the
dignity of the human person and that the primary aim of the
84. See Arato, supra note 82, at 376–77 (demonstrating the Court’s use of the
nonbinding recommendations of the Council of Europe’s European Commission
for Democracy Through Law (“Venice Commission”) as well as the nonbinding
recommendations of two committees of the International Labor Organization).
85. See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No 74025/01, 2005-XI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 193, 198–99 (2005) (citing the ICCPR, the CoE’s European Prison Rules, and
a report of the Venice Commission); see also Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No.
126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 7 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx? i=001-111044 (citing the ICCPR, the Venice Commission report, as
well as a report of the United Nations Human Rights Committee as relevant
international materials on the issues of prisoners’ rights and voting rights).
86. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16,
1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
(http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&
chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (noting that all members of the
Council of Europe are also signatories to the ICCPR).
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penitentiary system be the reformation and social rehabilitation of
the prisoner.87 There are several other international documents that
reaffirm Article 10’s principles; for example, Principle Ten of the
United Nations Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners states
that “favourable conditions shall be created for the reintegration of
the ex-prisoner into society.”88 Aside from other international
organizations, the Council of Europe itself stated these principles in
several different documents, including the European Prison Rules.89
2. International Documents Regarding Voting Rights and Criminal
Disenfranchisement Recommend the Abolition of Criminal
Disenfranchisement in Most Contexts
Article 25 of the ICCPR mandates that the right to vote not be
impeded by “unreasonable restrictions.”90 The meaning of this article
is not clear on its face; however, it has been interpreted as
prohibiting all but the most narrowly defined criminal

87. See ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 10(1) (stating that prisoners are entitled to a
basic level of human dignity and that the goal of the penitentiary system shall be
the rehabilitation of the prisoner).
88. Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111, U.N.
Doc A/RES/45/111 (Mar. 28, 1991); see also First United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Aug. 30, 1955, Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Rule 61, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html (stating that the treatment of
prisoners shall emphasize their continuing part in society, not their exclusion from
it).
89. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Recommendation Rec(2006)(2) of the Comm. of
Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules, Rules 5–7 (adopted
Jan. 11, 2006), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=955747&Site%20=CM&
BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=F
FAC75 (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter European Prison Rules]
(emphasizing that life in prison should approximate life outside of prison as closely
as possible); see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Recommendation Rec(2003)23 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Management by Prison
Administrators of Life Sentence and other Long-term Prisoners, Recommendations
2–5,
available
at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=75267&Site=CM
(recommending prisoners’ day to day lifestyle be comparable to the safety,
organization, and level of personal responsibility experienced in society).
90. See ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 25 (“Every citizen shall have the right and
opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions: (b) To vote and to be elected at
genuine periodic elections which shall be held by . . . secret ballot, guaranteeing
the free expression of the will of the electors.”).
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disenfranchisement laws.91 Several documents promulgated by the
Council of Europe make a clearer distinction, particularly Resolution
1459 of the Parliamentary Assembly, issued in 2005, which
recommends restriction of disenfranchisement to crimes against the
democratic process.92 Furthermore, in 2002 the European
Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), an
advisory body of the Council of Europe, made official
recommendations that disenfranchisement only be imposed for
serious criminal offenses, and even then only by the express decision
of a court of law.93

III. ANALYSIS
This section will argue that the decision in Scoppola (No. 3) is
inconsistent with the European Convention on Human Rights. This
section will look first at how the analysis of proportionality in
Scoppola (No. 3) is inconsistent with the analysis employed by the
Court in Hirst (No. 2). Second, it will examine how the decision in
Scoppola (No. 3) conflicts with western European norms as reflected
in the margin of appreciation and an evolutive interpretation of the
Convention. Finally, the last part of this section will employ an
analysis of the Convention under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to show that the decision in
Scoppola (No. 3) conflicts with more recent international and
European norms regarding voting rights and the treatment of
prisoners.

91. See generally Macdonald, supra note 3 (categorizing global criminal
disenfranchisement laws based on their compliance with the ICCPR).
92. See EUR. PARL. ASS., Abolition of Restrictions on the Right to Vote, Res.
1459 (2005) (justifying the limitations on disenfranchisement by reinforcing the
importance of the right to vote and the rehabilitative nature of imprisonment).
93. See European Commission for Democracy Through Law, July 5–6, Oct.
18–19, 2002 Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Op. No. 190/2002,
Section 1.1(d)(iv)–(v) (Oct. 20 2002), http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDLAD(2002)023rev-e.pdf
[hereinafter
Venice
Commission]
(predicating
disenfranchisement and the loss of political rights only in cases of mental
incapacity or criminal convictions).
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A. THE PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS IN SCOPPOLA (NO. 3)
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
IN HIRST (NO. 2)
The European Court of Human Rights employs a proportionality
analysis to determine if a State exceeds its margin of appreciation, by
weighing the limitation of the right against the discretion afforded
the state in forming its national policies.94 The Court, however, is not
strictly bound by its own precedent; in other words, the Court is not
absolutely required to follow its own judgments.95 The Court does
not depart from its own decisions lightly, but it has done so with its
analysis of proportionality in Scoppola.96
The first aspect of the proportionality analysis employed by the
Court in both cases is the analysis of the indiscriminate nature of the
disenfranchisement.97 Where the Court in Hirst (No. 2) felt that the
disenfranchisement of all convicted prisoners serving custodial
sentences was indiscriminate, the Court in Scoppola (No. 3) felt that
the disenfranchisement of all those convicted to sentences of three
years or more was not indiscriminate.98 The conclusion reached by
the Court in Scoppola (No. 3) is inconsistent with Hirst (No. 2)
because it focuses on the length of the sentence when the
determinative factor should be that the penalty applies without regard
to particulars of the crime, which is cited as a major factor in the

94. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 14 (emphasizing that an intense
standard of proportionality review reflects a narrow margin of appreciation).
95. See Goodwin Christine v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 471
(“While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, it is in
the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it
should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous
cases.”); see also Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 14
(2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?
i=001-111044
(applying the principle stated in the Goodwin case to the Scoppola (No. 3) case).
96. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 14 (deciding that comparative-law is
inclined to be more liberal with granting prisoners voting rights).
97. See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No 74025/01, 2005-IX Eur. Ct.
H.R. 193, 216 (2005) (emphasizing the blunt nature of the 1983 Representation of
the People Act because it strips the convention-protected right to vote from a
significant number of people in an indiscriminate manner).
98. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 16 (finding the Italian
disenfranchisement law proportionate in part because it lets prisoners serving less
than three years retain their voting rights).
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Hirst (No. 2) decision.99 This inconsistency is noted in Judge
Björgvinsson’s dissent in Scoppola (No. 3).100 It is also noted in the
Scoppola (No. 3) Chamber opinion.101 Furthermore, while the Court
in Scoppola (No. 3) refers to the Italian sentencing guidelines as a
factor weighing against finding the law indiscriminate, the Court in
Hirst (No. 2) considered no such guidelines in that decision.102
Another element of inconsistency arises from the Court’s point in
Hirst (No. 2) that the proportionality of the punishment is affected by
whether or not it is specifically announced at sentencing.103 The
Court in Hirst (No. 2) points to this as a factor in finding the law
disproportionate, even going so far as to imply that
disenfranchisement should be considered as a separate issue at
sentencing.104 This concept does not appear at all in the Court’s
analysis in Scoppola (No. 3), a point seized upon by the dissent.105
99. See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 216 (describing the disproportionate
nature of the English disenfranchisement law as applying automatically,
indiscriminately, and without regard to any individual circumstances of the crime).
100. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 19 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting)
(“While the Italian legislation may seem for this reason to be more lenient in
comparison with that of the United Kingdom, it is stricter in the sense that it
deprives prisoners of their right to vote beyond the duration of their prison
sentence and, for a large group of prisoners, for life.”).
101. See id. at 10 (making the point that the only factor in the
disenfranchisement was the length of the custodial sentence). It is unclear what
other particular arguments were raised in the Chamber decision in Scoppola (No.
3), as that judgment has not yet been translated into English.
102. See id. at 16 (“In the Court’s opinion the legal provisions in
Italy defining the circumstances in which individuals may be deprived of the right
to vote show the legislature’s concern to adjust the application of the measure
to the particular circumstances of the case in hand, taking into account such factors
as the gravity of the offense committed and the conduct of the offender.”).
103. See Hirst, 2005 IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 215869 (explicitly noting that British
courts do not announce the disenfranchisement penalty at sentencing).
104. See id. at 212–213 (stating that an independent court and an adversarial
procedure provide a safeguard against arbitrariness and disproportionality).
105. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 19 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Italian courts did not make any specific reference to [Scoppola’s]
disenfranchisement, and it is not apparent, beyond the fact that a court considered
it appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment, that there is any direct link
between the facts of his case and the removal of his right to vote”); see also Frodl
v. Austria, App. No. 20201/04, Eur. H.R. Rep. (2010), 8 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-98132 (interpreting Hirst (No. 2) as requiring the
independent determination of a judge to impose disenfranchisement, a proposition
rejected by the Scoppola (No. 3) Court).
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Indeed, in the Labita case, the Italian government explicitly argued
for disenfranchisement because of the unique threats posed by the
mafia to the Italian legal system.106 Ultimately, because the Italian
law buries the disenfranchisement penalty as an ancillary penalty to
the loss of the right to hold public office whereas the English law
states it outright, the English law is actually more proportionate in
this respect than the Italian law.107
The final element of the proportionality analysis employed in
Hirst (No. 2) is the use of the margin of appreciation to examine the
nature of domestic legislation.108 In Hirst (No. 2), the fact that
Parliament never considered the proportionality of the law weighed
heavily in the Court’s decision to find the law disproportionate.109 In
Scoppola, however, the Court engaged in no such discussion of
legislative history, and indeed seemed not to factor legislative history
into its decision at all, though its conspicuous absence was noted by
the dissent.110
The analysis of proportionality in the Scoppola (No. 3) case is
inconsistent with the analysis in the Hirst (No. 2) case. Of particular
note are the indiscriminate nature of the disenfranchisement, the
106. See Labita v. Italy, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 148 (declaring that the aim of
the government in disenfranchising Labita was to prevent the mafia from
influencing elections by voting for pro-mafia politicians, which the court
recognized may pose a threat to Italian politics); see also HARRIS ET AL., supra
note 5, at 717 (discussing how the court explicitly linked restrictions on the right to
vote based on age and citizenship to specific issues in the electoral system).
107. Compare Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 5 (“In the event of a lifetime ban
from public office . . . the convicted person shall be deprived of the right to vote . .
. and all other political rights.”), with Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 197 (“A
convicted person during the time that he is detained in a penal institution in
pursuance of his sentence . . . is legally incapable of voting at any parliamentary or
local election.”). See also Scoppola, App. No. 126/0519, at 19 (Björgvinsson, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that there is no clear link between denying a person the
right to run for office and denying a person the right to vote).
108. See Powers, supra note 54, at 287 (discussing how the Chamber in Hirst
(No. 2) evaluated the conduct of the Parliament in passing the RPA).
109. Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 197 (describing the debates of Parliament
on the 1983 Representation of the People Act as completely lacking in any
substance regarding the proportionality of or justifications for disenfranchisement).
110. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 19 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting)
(opining that the Italian legislature, like the British Parliament, never assessed the
proportionality of the measure, and emphasizing that the law disenfranchises a
large number of Italian criminals beyond the length of their custodial sentence).
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automatic nature of the disenfranchisement, applying the
disenfranchisement upon sentencing without notifying the convict,
and the fact that neither country ever considered proportionality
when passing its respective laws. If the Court had applied the
proportionality analysis consistently, it would have found the Italian
law just as disproportionate as the British law was seven years prior.

B. THE DECISION IN SCOPPOLA (NO. 3) IS INCONSISTENT WITH
WESTERN EUROPEAN NORMS OF PENAL CONDUCT
At its ratification, the Council of Europe intended the European
Convention on Human Rights to be a statement of the common
values of democracy and the rule of law held by the western
European states.111 Since the end of the Cold War, however, the
integration of eastern European states that do not share these
common historical values has caused some difficulty in reconciling
the new signatories with the existing norms under the Convention,
which is reflected in Scoppola (No. 3).112
1. The Decision in Scoppola (No. 3) Reflects an Overly Broad
Margin of Appreciation in the Area of Voting Rights
One of the arguments advanced by the Italian government in
Scoppola (No. 3) is that there is no European consensus on criminal
disenfranchisement and that this allows the Court to construe the
margin of appreciation broadly.113 Accordingly, the breadth of the
margin of appreciation on this issue is repeatedly referred to by the
Court in making its decision.114 While it is true that there is no single

111. See ECHR, supra note 5, at 5 (explaining that states that ratified the
Convention shared political traditions and ideals of freedom and rule of law).
112. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 216 (expressing the difficulty of
applying European consensus views when consensus views do not reflect a more
progressive construction of the Convention).
113. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 11 (explaining the argument of the
Italian government that there has historically been a broad margin of appreciation
in the area of criminal disenfranchisement). Contra id. at 17 (Björgvinsson, J.,
dissenting) (opining that while the margin of appreciation for the development of a
national electoral system is appropriately broad, the margin of appreciation for a
withdrawal of the right to vote, which directly affects the individual’s ability to
participate in the political process, should be much narrower).
114. See id. at 11, 17 (“The rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are
not absolute . . . . There are numerous ways of organizing and running electoral
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European approach on the issue, there is more nuance among
European states than is initially apparent. As of the Scoppola (No. 3)
decision, nineteen of forty-three Contracting States had no
restrictions on prisoner voting, seven imposed a ban on all
incarcerated prisoners, and the remaining sixteen adopted an
intermediate approach, disenfranchising some prisoners.115
The Court in Scoppola (No. 3) states that the purpose of the
margin of appreciation on the issue of electoral systems is to allow a
State to incorporate its own cultural history and diversity into a
unique democratic vision.116 However, of the seven Contracting
Parties that disenfranchise all prisoners, all but the United Kingdom
are former Soviet states without a strong history of democracy and
the rule of law, having joined the Convention in the last twenty
years.117 Indeed, a study of European disenfranchisement laws found
that general criminal disenfranchisement is associated with a
significantly lower level of political democratization.118 General
disenfranchisement policies are also highly correlated with the death
penalty, a practice that the Council of Europe recommends be
abolished, further showing that the penal policies of these postSoviet nations are out of step with the norms of the rest of Europe.119

systems and a wealth of differences . . . in historical development, cultural
diversity, and political thought within Europe.”).
115. See id. at 10–11 (categorizing the practices of the Council of Europe
member states on the issue of criminal disenfranchisement). See generally Greens
and M.T. v. United Kingdom, App. Nos 60041/08 and 60054/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep
21 (2011) (noting that Parliament failed to take action to change the law that was
found in violation in Hirst (No. 2)).
116. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 17 (emphasizing the variety of political
systems possible under the democratic process).
117. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Chart of Signatures and Ratifications,
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&
CL=ENG (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Council of Europe Signatures
and Ratifications] (showing that Armenia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
and Russia all ratified the First Protocol between the years 1992 and 2002).
118. See Christopher Uggen et al., Punishment and Social Exclusion: National
Differences in Prisoner Disenfranchisement, in CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 71 (Alec Ewald & Brandon Rottinghaus eds.,
2009) (finding that European nations with no criminal disenfranchisement had a
mean democratization index score of 30.15, whereas nations with full criminal
disenfranchisement had a mean score of 24.49).
119. See id. (showing that the mean likelihood of a nation maintaining the death
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Further reducing the clarity on this issue is the vast disparity of
practices among the sixteen states that impose a limited form of
criminal disenfranchisement.120 At one end of the spectrum, there are
States such as Italy, which disenfranchise a significant number of
offenders based on the length of sentence. On the other end are
States like Germany, which restrict criminal disenfranchisement to
particular crimes and leave the determination of whether to impose
disenfranchisement to the discretion of a court.121
The degree of variation in penal policy is significantly reduced
when one looks at States that ratified the Convention at or near its
inception, like Italy.122 Of these fifteen states, Italy stands only with
the United Kingdom and Turkey in maintaining an automatic
criminal disenfranchisement law that does not provide for judicial
determination of the penalty.123 If the consensus view of only these
penalty was 0.333 for general disenfranchisement countries and 0.083 for nondisenfranchising countries); see also EUR. PARL. ASS., Position of the
Parliamentary Assembly as Regards the Council of Europe Member and Observer
States Which Have not Abolished the Death Penalty, Doc. No. 10911,
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc06/EDOC10
911.htm, Apr. 21, 2006 (recommending that all member and observer countries to
the Council of Europe abolish the death penalty in accordance with previous
Council recommendations).
120. Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 11 (listing Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, and Turkey as
states that have limited criminal disenfranchisement).
121. See Nora V. Demleitner, U.S Felon Disenfranchisement: Parting Ways
with Western Europe, supra note 188, at 86 (characterizing German law as only
allowing disenfranchisement as a separate punishment for a narrowly defined set
of crimes either directly relating to voter fraud or that target the foundations of the
German state; in the year 2003, only two people were sentenced to
disenfranchisement under these laws); see also LALEH ISPAHANI, Voting Rights
and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfranchisement
Laws, in CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 29
(Alec Ewald & Brandon Rottinghaus eds., 2009) (offering Norway as an example
where the law specifically states that a court must explicitly impose
disenfranchisement, and pointing out that such punishment is “very rare”).
122. See Council of Europe Signatures and Ratifications, supra note 117
(showing that Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom all ratified the First Protocol before 1960).
123. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 11 (differentiating the sixteen states
with limited disenfranchisement according to whether the decision to impose
disenfranchisement remains in the discretion of the court).
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states were to apply in forming a margin of appreciation, the Court in
Scoppola (No. 3) would have almost certainly found that the Italian
disenfranchisement law violated the Convention because it does not
provide for such judicial discretion, especially considering that the
Court had previously held that a similar British law violated the
Convention.124 Ultimately, the end of the cold war and the resulting
expansion of the Council of Europe created a wide variation in
criminal disenfranchisement policies among its Contracting States.
This expansion broadened the margin of appreciation on criminal
disenfranchisement, allowing the Italian law to be upheld in
Scoppola (No. 3) even though it is out of step with the majority of
western European nations.
2. The Decision in Scoppola (No. 3) Has a Deleterious Effect on
Evolutive Interpretation
The broadening of the margin of appreciation, as seen in Scoppola
(No. 3), also has implications for the use of evolutive interpretation
by the Court, specifically the possibility that the adoption of
consensus views drags the standard of human rights down to the
lowest common denominator.125 Evolutive interpretation is based on
the principle that changing social attitudes should be accounted for
when broadening the protections under the convention.126 The
decision in Scoppola (No. 3) therefore can be viewed as a kind of
devolutive judgment, removing the protections seemingly guaranteed
by Hirst (No. 2), a view expressed by Judge Björgvinsson in his
dissent.127
124. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.ii (discussing the resolution of the Hirst
(No. 2) case).
125. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 196 (theorizing that an evolutive
interpretation may result in sacrificing the quality of the Convention standard of
human rights in search of a uniform European approach); see also Paolo G.
Carozza, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights:
Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1217, 1231 (1998) (opining that the integration of eastern
European nations with divergent legal and political traditions will necessarily
result in a lowering of established standards).
126. See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the rationale underlying the
doctrine of evolutive interpretation).
127. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 26–29 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting)
(lamenting that the decision in Scoppola (No. 3) has rolled back any protections for
prisoner’s voting rights that were gained in the Hirst (No. 2) decision).
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In Scoppola (No. 3), the Court took the protection granted in Hirst
(No. 2) and, mindful of the lack of a European consensus on the
issue, still decided to reverse itself.128 The use of comparative law in
evolutive interpretation is legitimized because it brings interpretation
of the Convention in line with recognized human rights standards.129
Therefore, the judgment in Scoppola (No. 3) caused the Court to
become inconsistent with the recognized human rights standard,
which disfavors criminal disenfranchisement in almost all contexts,
especially when there is no judicial determination of the
disenfranchisement penalty.130
Beyond simply reversing the evolutive trend of the Court in the
area of criminal disenfranchisement, the decision in Scoppola (No. 3)
also raises concerns about the legitimacy of the Court, as it makes
the Court seem inconsistent and unpredictable.131 The inconsistency
is particularly problematic in this instance because the judgment in
Scoppola (No. 3) drastically reduces the scope of a protection that
had seemingly been granted in Hirst (No. 2), contrary to the purpose
of evolutive interpretation, which is to broaden the Court’s
interpretation of Convention terms and bring that interpretation in
line with modern norms.132

128. See id. at 11, 23-24 (emphasizing the lack of European consensus on the
issue of disenfranchisement, especially on whether an independent determination
of the penalty is necessary).
129. See HARRIS et al., supra note 5, at 9 (asserting that the Court should be
aware that just because a practice is the European consensus, that does not
necessarily make it an admirable standard).
130. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (highlighting key documents of the
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice Commission which
recommend limits on criminal disenfranchisement).
131. See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Evolutive
Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J.
1730, 1742 (2011) (emphasizing that the Court needs to make evolutive
interpretation more predictable to maintain process legitimacy); see also
FRANÇOISE TULKENS, EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DIALOGUE BETWEEN
JUDGES 2011: WHAT ARE THE LIMITS TO THE EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONVENTION? 8 (2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/
D901069F-76A0-401F-BF48-248FC80E728A/0/DIALOGUE_2011_EN.pdf
(commenting as a Section President of the ECHR, Tulkens noted that one of the
major criticisms of evolutive interpretation is that it threatens democratic
legitimacy).
132. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 196 (“[T]he comparative method
should be better employed to construe the meaning and scope of the Convention
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C. THE DECISION IN SCOPPOLA (NO. 3) IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHEN ANALYZED IN
THE CONTEXT OF RECENT INTERNATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS AND
PRISONERS’ RIGHTS DOCUMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 31(3)(C) OF THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
The text of Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights states simply that the Contracting
Parties shall hold free elections, at regular intervals, under conditions
that ensure the free expression of the people in the choice of
legislature.133 This does not answer the question of whether the Court
was correct in upholding the Italian disenfranchisement law in
Scoppola (No. 3); in this situation, it is instructive to use Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention to evaluate whether the Italian
law is consistent with international norms.
1. The Stated Aims of Criminal Disenfranchisement
in the Scoppola (No. 3) Decision Are Inconsistent
with International Norms of Penal Policy
Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights covers the general treatment of prisoners, mandating that they
be treated with the respect and dignity of the human person and that
the primary aim of the penitentiary system be the reformation and
social rehabilitation of the prisoner.134 This formulation necessarily
invites an analysis of whether the aims of criminal
disenfranchisement enumerated by the Italian government in
Scoppola
(No.
3)
conform
to
this
mandate.
The Court in Scoppola (No. 3) accepted wholesale the Grand
Chamber’s analysis in Hirst (No. 2) that the criminal
disenfranchisement law served the legitimate aims of “preventing
crime and enhancing civic responsibility for the rule of law.”135
terms in such a way as to reinforce and widen the protection of rights and
freedoms.”).
133. First Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3.
134. ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 10(1), (3) (“All persons deprived of their liberty
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person . . . The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners
the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.”).
135. See Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 13
(2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111044 (citing
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Evaluating both of these aims in light of Article 10 of the ICCPR
demonstrates their inconsistency with international norms.
The first aim purports to enhance civic responsibility and respect
for the rule of law. Disenfranchisement does precisely the
opposite.136 In a democratic society, the legitimacy of the
government is derived from the will of the people; for the legislature,
elected by the people, to restrict the right of some people to choose
the legislature is inherently delegitimizing.137 Furthermore, criminal
disenfranchisement is contrary to the principle of universal suffrage,
which the European Court of Human Rights has called the baseline
of protection.138
The governments in both the Scoppola (No. 3) and Hirst (No. 2)
cases argue that criminal disenfranchisement is necessary to teach
convicts respect for the rule of law.139 Disenfranchisement achieves
the opposite end here, as well.140 The clearest lesson that

to sections 74 and 75 of the Hirst (No. 2) decision for the statement of the
legitimate aim).
136. See Sauvé v. Canada (No. 2), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, ¶ 31 (Can.) (stating that
denying inmates the right to vote undermines the rights of all Canadians by
misrepresenting the nature of the right).
137. See id. at ¶ 34 (“A government that restricts the franchise to a select portion
of citizens is a government that weakens its ability to function as the legitimate
representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardizes its claim to representative
democracy, and erodes the basis of its right to convict and punish law-breakers.”);
see also Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 18 (acknowledging that departures from
universal suffrage undermine the democratic validity of the legislature and the
laws that it promulgates, and such departures cannot be made without
justification).
138. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 17 (restating the principle from
Mathieu-Mohin that, in a democratic society, there is a presumption against
restrictions on the franchise because voting is a right, not a privilege); see also
Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 209 (using the United Kingdom’s gradual
expansion of the franchise to all groups to demonstrate the transition from the view
of voting as a privilege to voting as a right).
139. See id. at 207 (“The Government argued that the disqualification in this
case pursued the intertwined legitimate aims of preventing crime and punishing
offenders and enhancing civic responsibility and the rule of law.”).
140. See Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchisement with
Citizenship Theory, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 53, 92 (2006) (“Given that over
95% of prisoners and all parolees and probationers are re-released into the
community, the edification of convicts’ virtue is a matter of pressing importance . .
. . By placing a mark of infamy on convicts, disenfranchisement can . . . increase
the incidence of recidivism and impede the assimilation of released offenders.”).
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disenfranchisement teaches the offender is that he is less than
others.141 Indeed, the United Kingdom made clear in Hirst (No. 2)
that it believed prisoners, by virtue of their imprisonment, lost the
moral authority to participate in the decisions of society.142
Furthermore, the Italian law at issue in Scoppola (No. 3) does not
even mandate that the disenfranchisement penalty be announced at
sentencing, delaying any educative impact until the prisoner
discovers his disenfranchisement on his own.143
The final aim of the disenfranchisement law, preventing crime by
enhancing punishment, is so broad and vague an aim that it could be
said of nearly all penal measures.144 It also implies that the
withdrawal of vital human rights beyond the right of liberty is a
justifiable punishment, a concept that conflicts with the European
Prison Rules promulgated by the Council of Europe.145
The aims articulated by the Italian government in Scoppola (No. 3)
do not emphasize the reintegration and reintroduction of the offender
into society and indeed may actually achieve the opposite, further
alienating the offender from society and exacerbating the difficulty
of reentry into society. Evaluating these aims in light of
contemporary international documents such as the ICCPR, the
European Prison Rules, and the United Nations Basic Principles for
141. See Lukas Muntingh & Julia Sloth-Nielsen, The Ballot as a Bulwark:
Prisoners’ Right to Vote in South Africa, supra note 117, at 234 (quoting a South
African Constitutional Court case stating that the vote is a classless signifier of
unity among democratic citizens); see also Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 207–08
(including in the decision third-party prisoners’ rights campaigners who argued
that disenfranchisement furthers the exclusion of the convict); Sauvé, 3 S.C.R. 519,
¶ 35 (citing to the same South African case, which holds that the vote signifies that
“everybody counts”).
142. See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 207 (stating the opinion of the British
government that criminals, by virtue of their crime, violated the social contract and
were no longer entitled to have a say in the governance of their country).
143. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 27 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting) (noting
that beyond imposing a sentence of greater than three years imprisonment, the
Italian courts do not inform the prisoner that he is being disenfranchised).
144. See Sauvé, 3 S.C.R. 519, ¶ 22 (stating that a broad and abstract objective,
such as enhancing respect for the rule of law and ensuring appropriate punishment,
are susceptible to different meanings in different contexts and, consequently, to
distortion and manipulation).
145. See European Prison Rules, supra note 89, Rule 102.2 (“Imprisonment is
by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself and therefore the regime for
sentenced prisoners shall not aggravate the suffering inherent in imprisonment.”).
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the Treatment of Prisoners under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention, demonstrates that criminal disenfranchisement, at least
for the aims articulated in Scoppola (No. 3), are not consistent with
the obligation to hold free elections under Article 3 of the First
Protocol.
2. Contemporary International Documents on Voting Rights
Recommend the Abolition of Criminal Disenfranchisement in Nearly
Every Context
Article 25 of the ICCPR only prohibits “unreasonable restrictions”
on the right to vote, an inherently subjective criterion that does not
definitively answer whether the Italian criminal disenfranchisement
law at issue in the Scoppola (No. 3) case would violate that
provision. However, the analysis of the Court in Scoppola (No. 3) is
demonstrably inconsistent with recommendations of both the
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice
Commission. Both bodies indicate which restrictions on the right to
vote are acceptable by recommending that criminal
disenfranchisement as punishment for a crime be imposed only for
crimes against the political process and by the express decision of a
court of law.146
The Court in Scoppola (No. 3) touches on both of these issues in
its analysis of proportionality.147 With respect to the recommendation
that disenfranchisement only be imposed for serious crimes, the
Court actually stated that this factor weighed in favor of finding the
law proportionate because the Italian law does not disenfranchise
those convicted with sentences of less than three years.148 The Court
also heavily emphasizes that another factor in finding the
disenfranchisement law proportionate as a whole is that it also
provides for disenfranchisement of those convicted of crimes against

146. See discussion supra Part II.D.2 (discussing recent international documents
that recommend restrictions on criminal disenfranchisement).
147. See discussion supra Part III.A (analyzing the inconsistency between the
Court’s analysis of proportionality in Scoppola (No. 3) and Hirst (No. 2)).
148. See Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, at 23 (opining that, because the
Italian law does not disenfranchise those convicted to sentences of less than three
years, the Italian government has taken care to ensure that disenfranchisement is
limited to being a punishment for major crimes).
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the State or judicial system, as in the Labita case.149 The Court’s
interpretation of the Italian law remains inconsistent with the 2005
recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly, which recommends
that disenfranchisement be applied only to crimes against the State or
democratic process; whether an unacceptable restriction on the right
to vote adjoins an acceptable restriction should not be a factor in
finding the unacceptable restriction acceptable.150
The Scoppola (No. 3) Court in its proportionality analysis
explicitly rejects the recommendation that disenfranchisement should
only be imposed by the express decision of a court.151 The Court
relies instead on the Italian guidelines for determining the length of a
sentence, which allow for consideration of individual circumstances
in deciding the length of the sentence and whether
disenfranchisement is imposed.152 This interpretation does not
conform to the Venice Commission’s recommendations, which
specifically state that the removal of voting rights can only be a
subsidiary penalty where there is a judicial determination of mental
incapacity and not merely a criminal conviction.153
The Venice Commission’s recommendations also state that the
standard for the removal of the right to run for public office may be
less strict than for the removal of voting rights.154 This
149. See id. at 22-23 (acknowledging that the Italian law also provides for
disenfranchisement based on other criteria besides length of sentence, even though
the situation in the case only involved disenfranchisement by length of sentence).
150. See Abolition of Restrictions on the Right to Vote, supra note 92, ¶ 8
(referencing the judgment in Hirst (No. 2) when urging Member States to
reconsider all disenfranchisement laws not specifically tied to crimes against the
democratic process).
151. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 21 (finding that while judicial
intervention is useful for determining whether a measure is proportionate, a
measure should not be automatically found to be disproportionate if it was not
issued by a judge).
152. See id. at 22–23 (emphasizing the discretion of the Italian judicial system in
determining the length of the sentence as a factor in finding the Italian law
proportionate).
153. See Venice Commission, supra note 93, at 15 (explaining that the
automatic removal of a person’s voting rights by operation of law is only
acceptable when there is a finding of mental incapacity).
154. See id. (asserting that the bar may be lower for the removal of the right to
run for public office because there is a greater public interest in preventing
dangerous people from obtaining public office than merely preventing them from
voting).

2013]

A DISPROPORTIONATE RESPONSE

867

recommendation creates inconsistency with the Italian law, which
explicitly frames the removal of voting rights as a subsidiary penalty
to the loss of the right to run for public office.155 Furthermore, the
Italian law does not require courts to announce an offender’s
disenfranchisement at sentencing, so the offender may not even be
aware that he has lost the right to vote.156
The Scoppola (No. 3) Court points to the possibility of early
release from prison and of a rehabilitation hearing reinstating the
offender’s right to vote as factors for finding the Italian system
proportionate.157 This interpretation runs counter to the Venice
Commission’s recommendations, allowing for an express hearing on
disenfranchisement only after it has already been imposed, rather
than before.158
Lastly, the decision of the Scoppola (No. 3) Court is inconsistent
with these international norms because it upholds a law that neither
provides for an independent judicial determination of the
disenfranchisement penalty nor restricts disenfranchisement to
political crimes or crimes against the democratic process.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The inconsistent ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in
Scoppola (No. 3) creates uncertainty in the international legal
community about how States should adjust their laws to comport
with minimum Convention standards.159 To that end, there are
155. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 28 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting)
(opining that there is no link between the loss of the right to run for public office
and the loss of the right to vote).
156. See id. at 27 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting) (noting that the Italian law, as
applied to Mr. Scoppola, did not notify him of his disenfranchisement at his
sentencing except that he was sentenced to imprisonment for greater than five
years).
157. See id. at 23 (emphasizing that the possibility of early release and
rehabilitation show that the Italian system is not “excessively rigid”).
158. See Venice Commission, supra note 93, at 15 (emphasizing that the express
decision of a court of law must be applied to the withdrawal of political rights, not
their reinstatement).
159. See generally Cesare Pitea, Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3): The Grand Chamber
Faces the “Constitutional Justice vs. Individual Justice” Dilemma (But It
Doesn’t Tell),
3
Strasbourg
Observers
(June
20,
2012),
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/06/20/scoppola-v-italy-no-3-the-grandchamber-faces-the-constitutional-justice-vs-individual-justice-dilemma-but-it-
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changes that should be made to both the Convention and the Court’s
jurisprudence that would produce more consistent results and provide
better guidance to the Contracting Parties.

A. THE CONVENTION SHOULD BE AMENDED TO ADD AN EXPLICIT
LIMITATIONS CLAUSE TO ARTICLE 3 OF THE FIRST PROTOCOL
The Council of Europe should amend Article 3 of the First
Protocol by adding an explicit limitations clause to narrow the
margin of appreciation in the area of voting rights, similar to those
found in Articles 8 through 11 of the Convention that impose
specific limitations on how States may violate rights protected by the
Convention.160 For example, Article 9(2) reads that a State may only
violate a person’s freedom of religion if it is prescribed by law,
necessary in a democratic society, done for the protection of public
order, health, or morals, or to protect the rights and freedoms of
others.161 Such a limitations clause, added to Article 3 of the First
Protocol, should prohibit the disenfranchisement of criminals except
when necessary for the preservation of a democratic society. This
result would reflect the narrow margin of appreciation for restrictions
on the right to vote advocated by Judge Björgvinsson in his Scoppola
(No. 3) dissent.162

B. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE SHOULD CONVENE A COMMITTEE TO
STUDY HOW THE INTEGRATION OF POST-SOVIET EASTERN
EUROPEAN STATES HAS AFFECTED THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
The European Court of Human Rights maintains a unique
position: balancing principles like “effective political democracy”
and the “rule of law” on the one hand, while basing its decisions in
the consent of the Member States on the other.163 A major issue with
doesnt-tell/ (lamenting the Scoppola (No. 3) Court’s lack of guidance to States that
desire to bring their policies in line with the Convention).
160. See HARRIS et al., supra note 5, at 344 (“The conditions upon which a state
may interfere with the enjoyment of a protected right are set out in elaborate terms
in the second paragraphs of Articles 8–11.”)
161. ECHR, supra note 5, art. 9(2) (imposing express limitations on the ability
of States to limit the freedom of religion).
162. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 17 (contrasting the broad margin of
appreciation on the issue of electoral systems with the narrow margin of
appreciation on the issue of individual voting rights).
163. See Carozza, supra note 125, at 1232 (“[T]he Court is at one and the same
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maintaining the consent of the governed is the broadening of the
margin of appreciation due to the inclusion of post-Soviet states that
do not share the western European heritage of democracy and the
rule of law. To that end, the Council of Europe should convene a
committee to evaluate whether the margin of appreciation on
criminal disenfranchisement has grown over the two decades since
the fall of communism. This does not necessarily require the Council
to take any action beyond studying the issue; however, the lack of
clarity in this area leads to inconsistent outcomes, as demonstrated in
the Hirst (No. 2) and Scoppola (No. 3) cases.

C. THE COURT SHOULD CHANGE ITS PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
TO REQUIRE THAT DISENFRANCHISEMENT ONLY BE ALLOWABLE
BY THE EXPRESS DECISION OF A COURT
The Council of Europe should adopt into the Convention the
recommendations of the Venice Commission issued in its 2002 Code
of Good Practice in Electoral Matters.164 Adopting these
recommendations would help the Court uphold the mandate of the
Convention to sustain “effective political democracy” when
assessing criminal disenfranchisement.165 The 2002 Code of Good
Practice recommends that the withdrawal of any political rights must
only be possible through the express decision of a court. 166
Incorporating this recommendation into the Convention would help
clarify how courts should approach arbitrary and indiscriminate laws
like those struck down by the Court in Hirst (No. 2) and upheld in
Scoppola (No. 3). This change would require courts to independently
time caught between the need to uphold a set of normative principles that are
outside the will of the Member States and the need to ground its decisions to some
degree in the consent of the Member States.”).
164. See Venice Commission, supra note 93, at 15 (enumerating the conditions
under which a person may be deprived of the right to vote).
165. See generally Council of Europe Venice Commission, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/Presentation_E.asp, (last visited Dec. 20,
2012) [hereinafter Venice Commission Website] (explaining the role of the
Commission as an advisory board of academics convened on behalf of the Council
of Europe to advise the Council members on Constitutional matters, and noting
that all members of the Council of Europe are members of the Commission); see
also Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 10 (citing the above noted provisions of the
Venice Commission document, such as how the proportionality principle must be
observed).
166. Venice Commission, supra note 93, at 6.
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consider disenfranchisement as a punishment, not as an ancillary
penalty167 or one conferred automatically upon conviction.168
Considering that as of the Scoppola (No. 3) decision on May 12,
2012, thirty-six of the forty-three Convention Contracting Parties
impose some kind of restrictions on criminal disenfranchisement,169
requiring that courts independently consider disenfranchisement as a
punishment based on the circumstances of the crime should easily
fall within the evolutive interpretation of the Convention.170
More drastic measures may be necessary, however; if that is the
case, the Court should adopt a proportionality analysis similar to the
analysis in Sauvé v. Canada (No. 2), which requires a rational
relationship between the legitimate aim and the measure intended to
further it.171 This is especially pertinent where there is evidence that
the State’s measures work counter to the aim they purport to
pursue.172
Adopting this standard would not invalidate all criminal
disenfranchisement laws. In fact, laws such as the one upheld in
Labita would still be presumptively valid. Preventing an accused or
convicted mafioso from voting is rationally related to maintaining an
“effective political democracy” and is consistent with the Hirst (No.
2) Court’s explicit allowance for disenfranchisement laws that
protect the political system.173
167. Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 6 (“In the Italian legal system a ban from
public office is an ancillary penalty which entails forfeiture of the right to vote.”).
168. Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 197 (describing the British criminal
disenfranchisement statute).
169. Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 10–11 (summarizing the state of criminal
disenfranchisement laws among the Contracting Parties). See generally
Macdonald, supra note 3, at 1386–87 (discussing the various forms of criminal
disenfranchisement laws, including a reference to a Luxembourg law that allowed
criminals to regain the right to vote by determination of the Grand Duke, which
received negative feedback from the Human Right Council).
170. See discussion supra Part II (explaining the “great majority” standard in the
evolutive interpretation).
171. See discussion supra Part III (providing further analysis of the Sauvé (No.
2) standard).
172. See Sauvé v. Canada (No. 2), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, 555 (Can.) (“Denying
prisoners the right to vote imposes negative costs on prisoners and on the penal
system. It removes a route to social development and rehabilitation acknowledged
since the time of [John Stuart] Mill, and it undermines correctional law and policy
directed towards rehabilitation and integration.”).
173. Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 212 (stating that while tolerance and
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V. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case
of Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3) demonstrates how contentious the issue
of criminal disenfranchisement is in Europe. Not only is the
judgment in that case inconsistent with the previous analysis of the
Court in the Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) case, it also
demonstrates how the current analysis is inconsistent with an
evolutive interpretation of the European Convention on Human
Rights. By analyzing the Convention in the context of recent
international documents on voting rights and prisoner’s rights under
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, the current analysis
allowing general disenfranchisement is untenable in a world where
prisoners are regarded as citizens and the ballot is a right, not a
privilege. While the current approach is the source of much
confusion, there is an opportunity here for the Council of Europe to
clarify the Convention to ensure that the voting rights of prisoners
are protected to the full extent promised by the Convention.

broadmindedness are hallmarks of a democratic society, such a society need not
tolerate activities which are designed to destroy rights protected by the
Convention).

